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Abstract
In this paper we examine the eﬀect of having an inﬂation targeting framework on the
dispersion of inﬂation forecasts from professional forecasters. We use a panel data set of
26 countries -including 14 inﬂation targeters- with monthly information from the last 16
years. We ﬁnd that the dispersion of long-run inﬂation expectations is lower in targeting
regimes after controlling for country-speciﬁc eﬀects, time-speciﬁc eﬀects, initial dispersion,
the level and the variance of inﬂation, disinﬂation periods, and global inﬂation. When we
diﬀerentiate between developed and developing countries, we ﬁnd diﬀerent dynamics for each
group. In particular, the mentioned eﬀect of inﬂation targeting seems to be present only on
the developing countries.
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Resumen
En este documento examinamos el efecto de tener un esquema de objetivos de inﬂaci´ on
sobre la dispersi´ on de pron´ osticos de inﬂaci´ on de pronosticadores profesionales. Usamos un
panel de 26 pa´ ıses, incluyendo 14 con objetivos de inﬂaci´ on, con informaci´ on mensual de
los ´ ultimos 16 a˜ nos. Encontramos que la dispersi´ on de las expectativas de inﬂaci´ on de largo
plazo es menor en reg´ ımenes de objetivos de inﬂaci´ on despu´ es de controlar por efectos-ﬁjos
por pa´ ıs, efectos-ﬁjos en el tiempo, la dispersi´ on inicial, el nivel y la varianza de la inﬂaci´ on,
periodos de desinﬂaci´ on e inﬂaci´ on global. Cuando diferenciamos entre pa´ ıses desarrollados
y pa´ ıses en desarrollo, encontramos diferentes din´ amicas para cada grupo. En particular, el
mencionado efecto parece estar presente ´ unicamente en pa´ ıses en desarrollo.
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around the world. Three main bene￿ts, all interrelated, have been associated with in￿ ation
targeting. First, that it successfully lowers in￿ ation and makes it less volatile.1 Second, that
it reduces the real costs of disin￿ ations.2 Finally, that it anchors long-run in￿ ation expecta-
tions at or very close to the in￿ ation target.3 Of these, the e⁄ect on in￿ ation expectations
is, in principle, straightforward, since a key aspect that separates in￿ ation targeting from
other sensible monetary policies is the public announcement of a numerical target, and the
subsequent referral to it in central bank communications. In fact, it is possible that the
impact of in￿ ation targeting on in￿ ation and on other macroeconomic variables may come
through its e⁄ect on in￿ ation expectations and on the expectations formation process: e.g.,
in￿ ation targeting could coordinate expectations and, in this way, become the nominal an-
chor of the economy; or it could be thought of as a commitment mechanism that improves
the signal-to-noise ratio in the economy, helping people to make a better-informed allocation
of resources. For this reason, and in contrast to other investigations that concentrate on the
e⁄ects of IT on in￿ ation or on macroeconomic variables, we concentrate on the e⁄ect of IT
on in￿ ation expectations.
By making the in￿ ation target explicit, IT provides a focal point that may anchor in￿ a-
tion expectations. If the central bank does not announce a target and if the performance of
the central bank is not evaluated based on a number or a range, then people in the econ-
omy need not have the same expectation about the future stance of monetary policy and,
therefore, in￿ ation expectations need not be anchored. Indeed, G￿rkaynak et al. (2006),
using in￿ ation expectations extracted from market instruments, provide evidence that ex-
pectations in Canada, the U.K., and Sweden, all IT countries, seem to be less sensitive to
macroeconomic news than in￿ ation expectations in the United States, a non-IT.
In￿ ation targeting may not only a⁄ect the level of in￿ ation expectations, but also the
dispersion of these expectations across economic agents. As an example, take two otherwise
identical countries with monetary policies conducive to low and stable in￿ ation, but one
with an explicit in￿ ation target (the IT country) and the other with an implicit one. The
potential bene￿t for the IT country is that the target becomes a focal point for the coor-
dination of expectations among agents. In contrast, in the country with an implicit target,
economic agents have to estimate the target in order to form their in￿ ation expectations
and, therefore, need not have the same in￿ ation expectation. As a result, the dispersion of
1Bernanke et al. (1999), Gon￿alves and Salles (forthcoming), Johnson (2002), Levin et al., (2004), Mishkin
and Schmidt-Hebbel, (forthcoming), and Vega and Winkelried (2005).
2Gon￿alves and Salles (forthcoming), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, (2007).
3Bernanke et al. (1999), Gon￿alves and Salles (forthcoming), G￿rkaynak et al. (2006), Johnson (2002),
Levin et al. (2004), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), and Vega and Winkelried (2005).
2in￿ ation expectations would be larger in the non-IT country.
The importance of heterogeneity in in￿ ation expectations for macroeconomic analysis
has been emphasized by Lucas (1972) and Phelps (1970). More recently, Mankiw, Reis
and Wolfers (2004, p. 2) go as far as suggesting that ￿... disagreement [about in￿ ation
expectations] may be a key to macroeconomic dynamics.￿ . In this paper we study how the
choice of a particular monetary policy scheme, in￿ ation targeting, a⁄ects this heterogeneity.
We use a simple macroeconomic model to show that, under IT, the optimal long-run
in￿ ation forecast is the target.4 Since this would be true for each forecaster, under IT the
dispersion across forecasters (i.e., the disagreement about in￿ ation expectations) should de-
crease, eventually collapsing around the target. We test this implication using survey data,
collected by the ￿rm Consensus Economics, on in￿ ation forecasts from professional forecast-
ers.5 We have data per-forecaster for 26 countries, of which 12 are industrial countries, 7
are from Latin America and 7 are from the Asian Paci￿c Region. From the 26 countries, 14
have implemented IT. The data is monthly, with forecast horizons of up to 24 months, and
spans the last 16 years.6
Yet, presenting convincing empirical evidence on the e⁄ects of in￿ ation targeting has
proven a di¢ cult task for at least two reasons. First, for what now is a considerable amount of
time, favorable conditions worldwide have helped tame in￿ ation around the world (Bernanke,
2004; Cecchetti, et al., 2006; Rogo⁄, 2003).7 Among these conditions we have central banks
becoming autonomous, ￿scal policies more favorable to low in￿ ation (e.g., debt renegotiations
and low ￿scal de￿cits), and openness to global trade (e.g., more competitive goods and labor
markets). Therefore, in recent times in￿ ation has been under control in most countries. This
makes it di¢ cult to identify the speci￿c contribution of in￿ ation targeting since, if these
conditions are not controlled for, their e⁄ects could be erroneously attributed to in￿ ation
targeting.8 Second, in particular in emerging countries, IT coincides for some periods with
disin￿ ation programs ￿ i.e., a restrictive monetary policy for long periods of time￿ , as well as
with other actions such as ￿scal retrenchment. Again, if these are not taken into account,
4As shown in the next section, this result holds if the central bank is an in￿ ation targeter, if there is
perfect and symmetric information, and if the agents in the economy have con￿dence in the central bank.
5Our choice of countries is determined by the availability of forecasts per-forecaster in the data from
Asian Consensus Forecasts, Consensus Forecasts and Latin American Consensus Forecasts. The data is an
unbalanced panel as detailed in the in￿ ation forecasts section.
6The countries studied are Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Singapore, South
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela.
7Although in more recent times, high prices of commodities appear to be dominating the global scene.
8A related point was made by Ball and Sheridan (2005). They argue that, regardless of the adoption of
in￿ ation targeting, countries with high and variable in￿ ation tend to show the largest gains in terms of the
behavior of in￿ ation because of a ￿regression to the mean￿e⁄ect.
3their e⁄ects could be attributed to IT. In general, the omission of relevant explanatory
variables is likely to bias upwards (in absolute value) the estimate of the e⁄ects of in￿ ation
targeting. The problem can be alleviated by adequately controlling for omitted variables
such as global in￿ ation and disin￿ ation periods, as well as for other variables that are hard
to measure or unobservable, such as the degree of central bank independence.
Our main result is that the dispersion of long-run in￿ ation expectations appears to be
lower under in￿ ation targeting regimes than in non-in￿ ation targeting ones, after controlling
for country-speci￿c events such as the level and the variance of in￿ ation and disin￿ ation
periods, and time-speci￿c e⁄ects such as global in￿ ation. Thus, we provide evidence that
suggests that in￿ ation targeting has helped anchor in￿ ation expectations. When we separate
the e⁄ects between developed and developing countries, we ￿nd that the e⁄ect is present in
the latter and, in line with Johnson (2002), that there seems to be no e⁄ect on the dispersion
of long-run expectations in the former.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the theoretical model. The data
on in￿ ation forecasts is described in section 2, while section 3 contains the empirical results.
Finally, a discussion and the implications of the analysis are presented in section 4. The
appendix extends the model to the case of a ￿ exible in￿ ation targeter.
1 Theory
In this section we use a simple canonical macroeconomic model to de￿ne what anchoring of
in￿ ation expectations means under in￿ ation targeting and to derive the implication that we
test in the empirical part.
1.1 In￿ ation targeting
In￿ ation l periods ahead is given by:
￿t+l = st ￿ it + "t+l; (1)
where st represents underlying in￿ ationary pressures, it is the monetary policy instrument,
and "t+l represents unforecastable shocks (with zero mean). s and " are assumed to be
independent of the monetary policy action, and the di⁄erence between them is that s is
realized before the choice of the monetary action while " is realized afterwards. Notice that
here l represents the control lag.9 This equation can be derived from a system with an IS
9This equation has been used before, among others, by Bernanke and Woodford (1997).
4and a Phillips Curve. In that case, st would be a vector with variables from both equations.
The central bank is a strict in￿ ation targeter.10 The central bank￿ s objective in period t



















where ￿ is a discount factor, ￿T is the target, and ￿t is the central bank￿ s information set.
Since in this simple case the instrument (e.g., the overnight rate) in period t will not a⁄ect
the in￿ ation rate in period t; but will do so until t + l, we can ￿nd the solution to the
optimization problem by assigning the instrument in period t to hit, on an expected basis,
the in￿ ation target for period t + l; the instrument in t + 1 to hit the in￿ ation target for
period t + l + 1; and so on (Svensson, 1997). Thus the central bank can ￿nd the optimal














The ￿rst order condition to solve (3) is:
E [￿t+l j ￿t] = ￿
T; (4)
where the expectation is evaluated at i￿
t; the optimal instrument.11 In (4) we can see that
the central bank sets its instrument to make the expected value of in￿ ation, conditional on
its information set, equal to the target (Svensson￿ s ￿In￿ ation Forecast Targeting￿ ). The
conditional expected value of in￿ ation is the target of the central bank.
If the central bank knows the equation for the economy (1), then it can use it to form its
expectation (to forecast), so that:
E [￿t+l j ￿t] = st ￿ it: (5)
Substituting (5) in (4) we get the optimal instrument:
i
￿
t = st ￿ ￿
T: (6)
In this economy, the equilibrium is obtained by substituting the optimal instrument (6)
10The case of a ￿ exible in￿ ation targeter is presented in the appendix.
11We have assumed that integration and di⁄erentiation can be interchanged.
5in the equation for the economy (1):
￿t+l = ￿
T + "t+l; (7)
where we can see that observed in￿ ation is not correlated with st; and that any dominant
characteristic of the vector st will not a⁄ect in￿ ation. Both are consequences of the central
bank acting to o⁄set or reinforce st; the underlying in￿ ationary pressures, in order to achieve
the target.12
We can solve for the agents￿rational forecast of in￿ ation in this setup. For the represen-
tative agent, if we assume that she chooses her forecast by minimizing Mean Squared Error









where ft+l;t is the forecast of in￿ ation made at t for period t + l; and It is the agent￿ s
information set. The ￿rst order condition is:
f
￿
t+l = E [￿t+l j It]:
This is the typical result that under MSE loss, in e⁄ect, the optimal forecast is the expected
value conditional on the information known at t:
If we assume that It = ￿t; that is, that there is symmetric information, then the agent
can also ￿nd the equilibrium (7), and use it to form the optimal forecast:
f
￿








Under perfect and symmetric information and full credibility, the optimal forecast for a
forecast horizon equal or greater than the control lag is the in￿ ation target. In this model
it is possible that, when the agent forms her expectation, actual in￿ ation may not be at the
target (deviates from it due to the error term), and despite this the expectation will still be
the target. This result re￿ ects the fact that in the model the agent has con￿dence that the
central bank would take the required steps to put in￿ ation back on track.
12Firms and individuals enter the economy through st: Since we assume that the central bank has perfect
information, it observes the behavior of the agents and o⁄sets or reinforces it as needed to achieve the
in￿ ation target.
61.2 No explicit in￿ ation target
To analyze what would happen in a country that has a sensible monetary policy but without
in￿ ation targeting, we can use the model presented before but assuming that the central
bank never reveals its in￿ ation target to the public.13 In such an environment, since the
representative agent does not know ￿T, she would have to estimate it. The reason is that
she knows that her best long-run forecast is the target, but she does not know the actual
number. In this scenario, the optimal forecast of the representative agent is:
f
￿












Therefore, the optimal forecast is the simple average of past in￿ ation, which is an unbiased
and consistent estimate of the target, given that observed in￿ ation is generated by equation
(7). In this setting, the precision of the estimate increases with time (as the standard errors
of the estimator decrease with the sample size).
1.3 Implications
The model is very simple, but it shows the e⁄ect of IT on the equilibrium process for in￿ ation
and on expectations. In particular, under in￿ ation targeting in￿ ation follows a stationary
process with mean equal to the target and the optimal forecast is the in￿ ation target for
horizons equal to or greater than the control lag.
Following the theoretical considerations, we propose the following:
De￿nition 1 In￿ation expectations are anchored when individual expectations with a fore-
cast horizon equal to or greater than the central bank￿ s control lag are at or very close to the
in￿ation target, even if in￿ation at the time at which the expectations are formed is not at
or close to the target.
According to our model, we would expect in￿ ation targeting to anchor expectations.
Therefore, at least one implication for in￿ ation expectations for horizons equal or greater
than the central bank￿ s control lag arise from the model: under an in￿ation targeting regime,
13Thus, in this subsection we take the view that in￿ ation targeting means an explicit target.
7the dispersion across agent￿ s long-run in￿ation expectations should be smaller than in non-
targeting regimes. This is the implication that we test. In countries without in￿ ation target-
ing (i.e., with no explicit in￿ ation target), the need to estimate the target opens the door to
dispersion of in￿ ation expectations once we consider several agents in the economy.14
Notice that, in countries with monetary policies conducive to low and stable in￿ ation but
where the target is not public, the heterogeneity across in￿ ation expectations will not be
very large because the estimates will be very close to the target (i.e., the dispersion would
only be driven by parameter uncertainty). However, in countries where the implicit in￿ ation
target has had a short history, because it changed or was nonexistent in the recent past (e.g.,
under ￿scal dominance), then the estimates may be very di⁄erent. As an example, take a
country where a change in the implicit target has occurred in the past, without informing
the public. Heterogeneity would arise because di⁄erent agents could use di⁄erent sample
windows to estimate the target. At least some agents would be using a sample that was
generated with another target (under the past regime) and hence their estimates would be
biased. Therefore, we expect that making explicit the target would help the most to reduce
the dispersion in those countries with relatively short histories of price stability.15 Hence, we
expect a stronger impact of in￿ ation targeting in less developed countries than in developed
ones.
2 Data on In￿ ation Expectations
We use survey measures of private forecasts to study the behavior of in￿ ation expectations.16
Our data comes from the ￿rm Consensus Economics. The database contains monthly in￿ a-
tion forecasts per-forecaster for 26 economies, taken from the Consensus Forecasts publica-
tions. Each month, Consensus Economics collects the forecasts from a number of ￿nancial
institutions and professional forecasters from each country. The forecasters report an ex-
pected rate of Consumer Price Index in￿ ation for the end of the current and following
calendar year, thus the longest forecast horizon is 24 months and the shortest is 1 month.
14Disagreement about in￿ ation expectations can be driven by many factors. The one described here,
learning, has been surveyed by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) and Carroll
(2003) propose di⁄erences in the information sets across agents. CapistrÆn and Timmermann (2006) use
di⁄erences in the costs of forecast errors.
15The uncertainty about the date of a structural break is one of many possible uncertainties that the
agents would face in an environment such as the one described here. Other uncertainties would also generate
heterogeneity, for example, data uncertainty, model uncertainty, etc.
16Two sources of private sector in￿ ation expectations have been used to study the behavior of in￿ ation
expectations: data from surveys of private in￿ ation forecasts (Bernanke et al., 1999; Johnson, 2002, 2003;
and Levin et al., 2004) and data from interest-rate di⁄erentials (G￿rkaynak et al., 2006; and Bernanke et
al., 1999).
8The average number of forecasters polled varies between countries. The number of individual
responses is higher for the industrialized countries, especially Japan, the United Kingdom
and the United States, than for other countries.
In contrast to some previous studies that su⁄er from selection bias by including only
developed economies (e.g., Johnson, 2002) or only emerging economies (e.g., Gon￿alves and
Salles, forthcoming), our sample is chosen according to the availability of in￿ ation forecasts
per forecaster so that the targeters and the non-targeters groups contain both, industrialized
and emerging economies. We use data for 12 industrial countries: Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and
the United States; 7 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru and Venezuela; and 7 economies from the Asian Paci￿c region: Australia, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand.17
The database is an unbalanced panel for two reasons. First, the data starts in di⁄erent
months for di⁄erent countries. For Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom and the United States, the in￿ ation forecasts per forecaster are compiled since
October 1989, for Norway and Switzerland since June 1998, and for the other industrial
countries since January 1995. In the Latin American region data exists on in￿ ation forecasts
since March 1993 for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela and since August 1997
for Colombia and Peru. For the Asian Paci￿c countries the in￿ ation forecasts are compiled
since December 1994. The data ends in November 2006 for all countries. The second reason
is that the data on in￿ ation forecasts for Latin America is bimonthly until April 2001.
From the countries in our sample, 14 have adopted IT: Australia in June 1993; Brazil
in July 1999; Canada in February 1991; Chile in September 1999; Colombia in September
1999; Mexico in February 2001; Norway in March 2001; Peru in January 2002; Spain in
January 1995, although in 1999 enters the European Union and hence drops the IT regime;
Sweden in January 1993; Switzerland in January 2000; South Korea in April 1998; Thailand
in January 2000; and the U.K. in October 1992.18 For all the IT countries, except Spain and
Sweden, the database contains data before in￿ ation targeting was adopted. Therefore, we
can analyze the behavior of expectations in the same country before and after IT, and we
17There are 4 countries in the Consensus Forecasts publications which do not appear in our study. New
Zealand is excluded because its CPI is calculated quarterly and there are no in￿ ation forecasts for the period
before IT. China and Taiwan are excluded because we could not ￿nd monthly CPI in￿ ation data for the
period that we study. India is excluded because the reported in￿ ation expectations are respect to a ￿scal
year instead of a calendar year.
18Chile, Mexico and Peru adopted a monetary policy scheme with some elements of an IT regime, including
an explicit target, in January 1991, February 1999, and January 1994, respectively. However, they only moved
to a full-￿ edged IT regime in the dates presented in the main text. Throughout the paper we use the latter
dates, except where we explicitly indicate otherwise.
9can also compare the behavior of expectations between countries with and without IT.
We use two measures of dispersion, the interquartile range across forecasters and a co-
e¢ cient of variation formed by dividing the interquartile range by the absolute value of the
median forecast (times 100). Both measures are robust to extreme values in the distributions
across forecasters, and the second takes into account the di⁄erences in the dispersion of ex-
pectations brought about by di⁄erences in the levels of in￿ ation across countries and through
time. The second measure has the problems that it is indeterminate when the median fore-
cast is zero, and it becomes very large when the absolute value of the median forecast is less
than one.19 We calculate the interquartile range and the median across forecasters using the
monthly forecasts for the current and the following year for each country. To clarify how we
calculate the two measures, take as an example the November 2006 forecasts for next year￿ s
in￿ ation in the United States (forecasts for in￿ ation in 2007 in the United States). The ￿rst
quartile is 2.10 percent, the median is 2.21 percent, and the third quartile is 2.50 percent.
Therefore, the interquartile range for November 2006 is 0.41, and the coe¢ cient of variation
is 0.41 divided by the median, 2.10, times 100, for a total of 18.6.
To get some sensibility about the information contained in the data, we compare the
distributions of coe¢ cients of variation from periods with IT to those without IT. In order
to do this, we divide the coe¢ cients of variation for the following year into two mutually
exclusive groups. One group contains observations from non-IT countries and the periods
before the adoption of IT on in￿ ation targeting countries. The other group contains ob-
servations for IT countries during periods after the implementation of this monetary policy
strategy. Figure 1 shows the box-plot of each group. For non-targeting periods, the mean
of the distribution is greater and the dispersion is higher than the corresponding moments
of the group containing the IT￿ s coe¢ cients of variation. In addition, extreme disagreement
(i.e., very large coe¢ cients of variation) only occurs in non-targeting periods.20 Thus, a
simple look at the data shows that, on average, IT may indeed lower the dispersion across
long-run in￿ ation expectations.
3 Empirical Results
We use two di⁄erent estimators in order to test our model￿ s implication that the dispersion
across agent￿ s long-run in￿ ation expectations should be smaller in targeting regimes. The
￿rst estimator is a ￿di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences￿estimator, previously used to investigate the
19In fact, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore were dropped from all the analysis that employs the coe¢ cients
of variation because in￿ ation was zero or near zero for a number of periods in these countries.
20Five observations corresponding to the non-targeting periods are not included in the ￿gure, all of them
above 250, with a maximum value of 800.
10e⁄ects of IT on other variables, such as the level and the variance of in￿ ation, by Ball and
Sheridan (2005), Gon￿alves and Salles (forthcoming), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (forth-
coming), and Vega and Winkelried (2005). The second estimator is a ￿xed e⁄ects estimator,
previously used by Johnson (2002). Both estimators control for omitted variables, unob-
served in most cases, that di⁄er from one country to the other but do not change over time
within each country (i.e., ￿xed e⁄ects). However, although both estimators are the same
when there are only two time periods, they are di⁄erent when there are more than two time
observations for each country, which is our case. In addition to control for ￿xed-e⁄ects,
the "di⁄s-in-di⁄s" estimator controls for time-￿xed e⁄ects, i.e., those variables that di⁄er
from month to month but do not change across countries within each month, while the
￿xed-e⁄ects estimator does not control, per se, for time-￿xed e⁄ects when there are more
than two time periods.21 Nevertheless, the ￿xed e⁄ects approach allows us to investigate the
e⁄ects of disin￿ ation periods and global in￿ ation on the dispersion across forecasters. Since
the latter varies through time but not across countries, it allows us to control for time-e⁄ects
in the ￿xed e⁄ects regression.
3.1 Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimator
Since the interest is on how IT a⁄ects a speci￿c variable, in our case the dispersion of in￿ ation
expectations, we calculate the average dispersion across time for the periods before and after
the implementation of IT for each of the IT countries, and the averages before and after a
particular date for each of the non-targeters. This particular date, as in previous literature,
is the average date of IT implementation in those countries with IT, which turns out to be
March 1998. Since many measures of economic performance, in particular those related to
in￿ ation, have improved in recent years around the world, following this methodology we
will compare the change in dispersion in targeting countries with the change in dispersion
in non-targeting countries. We implement the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach through the
regression:
CVfinal;i ￿ CVinitial;i = ￿0 + ￿1DITi + ￿
0Controlsi + ￿i (8)
where: CVfinal;i is the average of the coe¢ cients of variation for country i after the im-
plementation of IT (or after March 1998 for non-targeters), CVinitial;i is the average of the
coe¢ cients of variation for country i before IT adoption (or before March 1998 for non-
targeters), DITi is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if country i has in￿ ation
21As shown in Ball and Sheridan (2005) and elsewhere, the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach can control
for time invariant unobserved e⁄ects, even if they are correlated with the variable used to measure the
monetary policy regime (IT or other).
11targeting and zero otherwise. Controlsi is a vector of controls. In particular, we control for
the initial level of dispersion (CVinitial;i) in order to avoid a ￿reversion to the mean￿e⁄ect, as
countries with unusually high dispersions may tend to see the largest gains in the sense that
dispersion decreases regardless of whether they adopted IT. We also control for the change
in the variance of in￿ ation to take into account the e⁄ect that changes in the volatility of
in￿ ation could have on the changes in the dispersion of in￿ ation expectations. In addition,
we control for the change in the level of in￿ ation in each country. The regression has a
number of observations equal to the number of countries analyzed.
Table 1 reports the average dispersions for the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach using
forecasts for the current and the following year. The dispersion does not fall in non-targeting
countries but, as expected, it falls in some targeting countries. According to our theory, we
expect the results to be present, or stronger, for the forecasts for the following year, as at
least some are likely to be for a forecast horizon larger than the central banks￿control lag.
If we observe the forecasts for the following year, we can see that the coe¢ cient of variation
actually falls on average for the countries with in￿ ation targeting (-3.25) compared to the
non-targeters group, which sees an increase in the average coe¢ cient of variation (9.74).
Even though the change is positive for some targeters, the increase in the dispersion appears
smaller than the increase that occurs in non-targeters. Notice that the e⁄ect seems to be
stronger in developing countries. However, one has to be aware of the possibility of mean
reversion, since the coe¢ cient of variation was initially higher in the targeters group. See
the case of Brazil for example, which had the greatest fall in the coe¢ cient of variation from
the targeters group (-67.53) in our sample, but also had the highest initial coe¢ cient of
variation (80.94), supporting the idea that it is important to control for the initial level in
the regressions.
Table 2 reports the results from the estimation of equation (8), where we have used robust
standard errors calculated using White￿ s (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity. The results
are divided by forecast horizon, current year and following year, and by the controls included
in the regression. The ￿rst column corresponding to each horizon reports the results without
controls. In￿ ation targeting does not seem to have an e⁄ect in the short-run but, as expected,
the e⁄ect on the forecasts for next year is signi￿cant. The second column, corresponding to
each horizon, reports the results using the initial dispersion as control. The results for these
regressions also show an insigni￿cant e⁄ect of IT for the current year but, in line with our
theory, the dummy variable for in￿ ation targeting is signi￿cant at 10 percent when forecasts
for the following year are used. The control and the constant are also signi￿cant in the latter,
and these three variables explain 69 percent of the variation in the di⁄erences in dispersion.
The estimated e⁄ect of in￿ ation targeting on the dispersion of in￿ ation expectations is
12large. For example, Brazil has an initial level of 80.94 when forecasts for the following year
are used. The predicted value for the ￿nal level, given that Brazil adopted in￿ ation targeting,
is 26.27 (22.42 - 9.10 - 0.84*80.94 + 80.94), a considerable fall. We can also use our results to
calculate the counterfactual: the predicted value for the ￿nal level of dispersion, had Brazil
not adopted IT, is 35.37 (22.42 - 0 - 0.84*80.94 + 80.94). So, for Brazil, the adoption of IT
reduced the dispersion of in￿ ation expectations by 30 percent of what it would have been
without IT. It is also illustrative to present the same calculations for Malaysia, a non-targeter
with a large increase in dispersion. The initial level of dispersion for Malaysia is 13.19. The
predicted value for the ￿nal level, given that it is a non-targeter is 24.53 (compare it to the
observed 26.66). Had Malaysia adopted IT, the predicted ￿nal level (the counterfactual)
would have been much lower, 15.43.
Table 2 also presents the results for the regressions adding as an extra control the change
in in￿ ation￿ s variance. The new control is signi￿cant at least at 5 percent for both current and
following year forecasts, and with the expected sign: if the variance of in￿ ation increases, the
dispersion of forecasters is expected to increase as well. As is the case when only one control
is used, the dummy for IT is not signi￿cant for the forecasts for the current year. However,
the e⁄ect of IT is signi￿cant when forecasts for the following year are considered. In this
case, our regression is able to explain almost 90 percent of the variation in the di⁄erences in
dispersion. The results remain when we use the change in the level of in￿ ation as a control,
with a positive sign for the coe¢ cient on the level. We cannot have both the change in the
variance and the change in the level as controls due to the high correlation between these
variables.
As a robustness check, we performed the estimation of all the regressions dropping Brazil
￿ the targeter with the largest fall in dispersion￿and Argentina ￿ the non-targeter with the
largest increase. The qualitative results prevail.
3.2 Fixed-e⁄ects estimator
The second methodology is a ￿xed e⁄ects estimator applied to the unbalanced panel formed
from the monthly observations for each country. The ￿xed e⁄ects estimator controls for any
time-invariant characteristics speci￿c to a given country (e.g., the degree of central bank
independence, provided it did not change in the sample). The regression in this case is:
IRit = (￿0 + ￿1;i) + ￿2DITit + ￿3INFit + ￿4DDISit + ￿5WIt + "it; (9)
where: IRit is the interquartile range for country i in period t. DITit is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if country i has in￿ ation targeting in period t and zero otherwise.
13INFt is the annualized in￿ ation rate in country i in period t. DDISit is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if that month belongs to a disin￿ ation period, and zero otherwise.
Disin￿ ation periods are determined based on the methodology proposed by Ball (1994). A
disin￿ ation period is an episode that starts at an in￿ ation peak and ends at an in￿ ation
trough, with an annual in￿ ation rate at the trough at least 4 percentage points lower than at
the peak for emerging economies and at least 2 percentage points lower for developed ones.
Peaks are months in which trend in￿ ation is higher than both, the preceding six months
and the subsequent six months and viceversa. Trend in￿ ation is the centered 13 month
moving average.22 Finally, WIt is the monthly world average in￿ ation as reported in the
International Financial Statistics series (IFS) from the International Monetary Fund. This
is a time-varying variable that controls for global in￿ ation in order to take into account the
shocks that a⁄ect in￿ ation, and therefore in￿ ation expectations, across countries. However,
since it is the same for all countries within each month, it also captures the e⁄ect of other
time-speci￿c events.
We estimate regression (9) using ￿xed-e⁄ects and robust standard errors corrected using
White (1980)￿ s method. The results are reported in Table 3. Panel (a) uses the forecasts for
the current year to form the interquartile range. Panel (b) presents the estimates using the
forecasts for the following calendar year to calculate the dependent variable.
Looking at the results using the forecasts with horizons that are probably below monetary
policy￿ s control lag in most countries (forecasts for the current year in panel (a)), we ￿nd
that IT has the e⁄ect of decreasing the dispersion across in￿ ation expectations, but that
this e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant when controls are included in the regression. The
coe¢ cient on the control for the level of in￿ ation has the expected sign, as an increase in
the level of in￿ ation increases the dispersion across forecasters, and is marginally signi￿cant
(it is signi￿cant at 11 percent). The e⁄ect of disin￿ ation periods has a negative sign, which
means that disin￿ ation periods are associated with smaller coe¢ cients of variation, but is
not signi￿cant. The control for global in￿ ation has a positive sign, as expected, but is not
signi￿cant either. According to the t-statistics for each variable, only the level of in￿ ation is
22The estimated disin￿ ation periods are as follows: for Argentina, Jan-90 to Jul-96 and Oct-02 to Feb-04.
For Brazil, May-90 to Dec-91, Mar-94 to Dec-98 and May-03 to Aug-04. For Canada, Apr-91 to Jul-92 and
Jan-03 to Mar-04. For Chile, Jul-90 to Dec-99 and Mar-03 to Apr-04. For Colombia, Mar-91 to Oct-03 and
Feb-98 to Aug-02. For Hong Kong, Jan-95 to Dec-99. For Indonesia, Sep-95 to Feb-97, Oct-98 to Feb-00 and
Dec-01 to May-04. For Italy, Oct-95 to Nov-97. For Japan, Jan-91 to Aug-95 and Aug-97 to Oct-03. For
Malaysia, Aug-98 to Aug-01. For Mexico, Nov-90 to Jun-94, Nov-95 to May-98 and May-99 to May-02. For
the Netherlands, Nov-91 to Jan-93 and Jul-01 to Jul-04. For Norway, Dec-00 to May-02. For Peru, Dec-90 to
Dec-95, Jul-96 to Sep-99 and May-00 to Mar-02. For South Korea, May-98 to Jul-99. For Spain, Dec-94 to
Oct-97. For Sweden, Jan-95 to Dec-96 and Dec-97 to Dec-98. For Thailand, Mar-98 to Oct-99. For United
Kingdom, Feb-91 to Aug-94. For Venezuela, Dec-94 to Jul-95, Sep-96 to Jul-01 and Mar-03 to May-06. The
countries not mentioned do not have disin￿ ation periods according to the implemented methodology.
14able to explain the dispersion of in￿ ation expectations in the short run.
Using the forecasts for the following year (panel (b)), the e⁄ect of in￿ ation targeting is
signi￿cant at 5 percent. As expected, IT reduces the dispersion of in￿ ation expectations in
the sample. The e⁄ect is large but decreases when we include more controls, although it
remains signi￿cant. In addition, we can see that during disin￿ ation periods the dispersion
across forecasters also decreases. The other controls are signi￿cant and with the same signs
as when using current year forecasts. In general, it appears that in￿ ation targeting seems to
reduce the dispersion of expectations with horizons ranging from one to two years.
We performed a series of robustness checks. The results are qualitatively the same when
we estimate regression (9) using the ￿rst date of IT implementation (that a⁄ects Chile, Mex-
ico and Peru) instead of the second date, but with a smaller e⁄ect of in￿ ation targeting. In
addition, and as is the case for the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimator, the qualitative results
prevail when we exclude Brazil and Argentina from the sample. We also did the regressions
using time-e⁄ects instead of the variable global in￿ ation, and the results are robust to this
change. As another check, we used an estimate of the conditional variance of in￿ ation using
the best AR(12)-GARCH(1,1) model (Bollerslev, 1986) selected by the Schwarz criterion for
each country. We used the variable as a control instead of the level of in￿ ation. The results
are, again, qualitatively the same. Finally, we estimated the regression with the controls
but pooling the data and applying panel-corrected standard errors, including a correction
for AR(1) errors for each country. The results remain unaltered, but the coe¢ cients are of
a smaller magnitude.23
3.3 E⁄ect on developed countries
To our knowledge, the only evidence so far about the e⁄ect of IT on the dispersion of in￿ ation
expectations is provided by Johnson (2002). Using a panel of 11 developed countries, he
reports that the dispersion, measured as the standard deviation across forecasters, falls in
the 1990s in all countries, targeters and non-targeters, but that once the e⁄ect of the level
of in￿ ation, that also falls in all countries, is taken into account: ￿... there is little or
no additional reduction in the dispersion of in￿ ation forecasts associated with the period
after the announcement of the in￿ ation targets￿(Johnson, 2002, p. 1537). Therefore, it
is interesting to see if our result is driven by what happens with developing economies, as
would seem the case with other bene￿ts associated with in￿ ation targeting (e.g., Gon￿alves
and Salles, forthcoming).
In order to separate the results for industrial countries and for emerging economies, we
23The results are available from the authors upon request.
15use a dummy variable that takes the value of one for industrial countries and zero otherwise,
and interact it with the dummy for in￿ ation targeting and with the other independent
variables (the controls). We re-estimate equation (9) including the interactions. The results
are presented in the last column of panels (a) and (b) of Table 3.
For the current year forecasts none of the interactions is statistically di⁄erent from zero,
indicating that there is not a di⁄erentiated e⁄ect in the short-run. However, all the interac-
tions are signi￿cant for forecasts for the following year, which indicates that the dynamics of
the dispersion is very di⁄erent between developed and developing countries in the long-run.
In particular, the coe¢ cient associated with the dummy for in￿ ation targeting, that now
captures the e⁄ect on developing countries from Latin America and from Asia, is negative,
large (i.e., larger than the estimated coe¢ cient using the full sample) and statistically sig-
ni￿cant. The coe¢ cient on the interaction between industrial countries and the IT dummy
has a positive sign. To calculate the total e⁄ect of IT on industrial countries we add this
coe¢ cient and the one of the IT dummy, and test the hypothesis that the sum is equal to
zero. We ￿nd that the sum, 0.01, is positive but is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
Therefore, there appears to be no e⁄ect of IT on the dispersion of long-run expectations in
developed countries. In addition, the e⁄ect of all the other variables increases (in absolute
value) or remains the same for developing countries, and decreases (in absolute value) for
industrial countries. In particular, the e⁄ect of disin￿ ations changes its sign in industrial
countries (is 0.06 and it is statistically signi￿cant).
Overall, the results from this exercise suggest that: (i) the dynamics of the dispersion
of long-run expectations across forecasters is di⁄erent in developing countries compared to
developed countries; (ii) the e⁄ect of IT on the dispersion of in￿ ation expectations is driven
by what happens in emerging economies; and (ii) IT seems not to a⁄ect the dispersion of
long-run expectations in developed countries.
4 Discussion and Implications of the Results
In this paper we ￿nd that, controlling for other factors, the dispersion of long-run in￿ ation
expectations appears to be lower under in￿ ation targeting regimes than in non-in￿ ation
targeting ones, which would validate the prediction of our model. This is remarkable given
the strong assumptions under which we derived the theoretical results, but it re￿ ects the
capacity of in￿ ation targeting to focalize in￿ ation expectations. It is interesting that IT
seems to provide a focal point even though some countries have as an in￿ ation target a
range and not a point (e.g., Chile and Colombia).
When we separate the e⁄ects between developed and developing countries, we ￿nd that
16our result seems to be driven by the latter and, in line with Johnson (2002), that there
seems to be no e⁄ect of IT on the dispersion of long-run expectations in developed countries.
This could be because focalizing in￿ ation expectations is more important in countries which
have experienced high and variable in￿ ation in the past, and is less so in countries in which
the transition to an in￿ ation targeting regime may have only formalized an implicit target
that was already maintaining a relatively low dispersion of in￿ ation expectations. In this
respect, it is likely that the cost-bene￿t ratio of adopting an explicit target would be lower for
emerging countries with respect to developed ones, as the bene￿ts of anchoring expectations
could be greater than the costs of ￿tying their hands￿with an explicit target (in fact, the
discipline may even be bene￿cial).24
The lack of an e⁄ect of IT on the dispersion of long-run in￿ ation expectations in devel-
oped countries could be related to the use of data from professional forecasters. Given the
relative stability of in￿ ation in those countries, professional forecasters may have an homo-
geneous view about the future developments of in￿ ation in developed countries. Therefore
the dispersion may remain almost unaltered when an explicit in￿ ation target is introduced.
However, this need not be the case for expectations of other agents, for instance consumers
or unions. It still could be the case that the dispersion across in￿ ation expectations for those
agents experiences a reduction after the introduction of a focal point such as an explicit
in￿ ation target. This is an interesting topic for future research. An e⁄ect in developed coun-
tries could also be present in forecasts from professional forecasters, but with larger forecast
horizons (i.e., more than two years).
We have documented that IT can reduce the dispersion of in￿ ation expectations. This
e⁄ect can, in turn, a⁄ect other macroeconomic variables, illustrating that indeed, the e⁄ect
on in￿ ation expectations could be the channel through which IT may a⁄ect the economy.
Perhaps the most important direct e⁄ect is that, if the real costs of nominal movements in
the economy are related to the dispersion of in￿ ation expectations (Lucas, 1972; Phelps,
1970), having less disperse expectations, for a given level of in￿ ation, may reduce the real
costs of disin￿ ations. Less disperse expectations may also reduce the variance in relative
prices, which in turn can reduce the level of in￿ ation (Ball and Mankiw, 1995). Firms and
individuals may also rely more on expected in￿ ation (the target) to set prices, which could
make in￿ ation less persistent (Orphanides and Williams, 2005). In addition, more agents
are using the optimal forecast (the target), so the forecast errors and the costs incurred by
decisions based on those forecasts may also decrease.
24Since the use of an explicit target imposes and extra restriction that the central bank has to ful￿ll, there
is an important trade-o⁄ associated with in￿ ation targeting in terms of ￿ exibility. There is another trade-o⁄
with respect to the optimal degree of transparency, recently put forward by Walsh (2007).
17Finally, the fall in the dispersion of in￿ ation expectations may enhance the e⁄ectiveness
of the expectations channel of monetary transmission. If this is the case, considering that this
mechanism has a smaller control lag than other mechanisms, the central bank has greater
￿ exibility to conduct monetary policy. If the central bank can exert at least some control
over in￿ ation expectations, as seems to be the case under IT, then expectations also become
a monetary policy instrument.
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20Appendix
Flexible in￿ ation targeting
If the central bank is a ￿ exible in￿ ation targeter, then its objective in period t is to choose























where ￿ > 0 is the relative weight on output stabilization, and yt is the output gap. As is
the case for the strict in￿ ation targeter, the central bank can ￿nd the optimal instrument in


















where we have assumed that the control lag for the output gap is smaller than for in￿ ation
(Svensson, 1997).
The ￿rst order condition, using the notation E [￿ j ￿t] = Et [￿] is:








where the expectations are evaluated at i￿
t, the optimal instrument, and we have assumed
that integration and di⁄erentiation can be interchanged. In this case the central bank sets
its instrument to make the conditional expected value of in￿ ation equal to the target only if
the expected output gap is equal to zero. Otherwise the in￿ ation forecast should di⁄er from
the in￿ ation target in a proportion of the expected output gap. The proportion increases
with the weight attached to output in the central bank￿ s loss function and with the marginal
e⁄ect of the interest rate on the output gap. The proportion decreases with the marginal
e⁄ect of the interest rate on in￿ ation.
In contrast to the case of a strict in￿ ation targeter (￿ = 0), a ￿ exible targeter has
considerations for output and this is re￿ ected in its in￿ ation forecasts. In this case the
forecast of the central bank is equal to the target only when the expected output gap is
zero. The agents in this economy would need to consider forecasts of the output gap and,
typically, estimates of ￿ in order to calculate their in￿ ation forecasts. These are extra
sources of uncertainty and will likely generate some dispersion across forecasters. Yet, this
dispersion should still be smaller than the one induced by other sensible monetary policies
21as, on average, the in￿ ation target is a good forecast of in￿ ation:






















where the ￿rst step follows from the application of the Law of Iterated Expectations, and


























































1/ Coefficients of variation were calculated as the interquartile range across forecasters divided by the absolute value of  
the median using monthly forecasts for next year inflation. The box-plot for non-targeters includes data from: Argentina, 
France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the United States and Venezuela, and data from targeting 
countries before they implemented inflation targeting. The box-plot for targeters includes data from: Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, South Korea, Spain from 1995 to 1999, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand and United Kingdom, after they implemented inflation targeting.. 
2/ Although the maximum value for the coefficient of variation encompassed by the whiskers is 250, there are 5 
observations for the non-targeters not included in the figure, with a maximum value of 800. 
Source: Data from Consensus Forecasts. 
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Date Initial cv Final cv Change Initial cv Final cv Change
Brazil Jul-99 32.60 7.69 -24.91 80.94 13.41 -67.53
Chile Sep-99 4.66 11.35 6.70 10.67 8.05 -2.62
Colombia Sep-99 5.70 6.66 0.95 9.01 10.43 1.42
Mexico Feb-01 5.37 6.64 1.27 14.66 12.41 -2.25
Peru Jan-02 14.35 16.65 2.30 18.94 15.15 -3.79
Canada Feb-91 3.80 12.73 8.93 8.34 16.95 8.61
Norway Mar-01 3.62 14.97 11.35 7.98 13.19 5.21
Switzerland Jan-00 21.89 18.31 -3.59 17.83 26.17 8.33
United Kingdom Oct-92 4.50 7.93 3.43 15.47 15.73 0.26
Australia Jun-93 0.17 0.12 -0.05 0.24 0.19 -0.05
Thailand Jan-00 24.42 20.36 -4.07 21.41 26.49 5.08
South Korea Apr-98 8.33 14.44 6.11 12.69 21.02 8.33
Targeters Mean Mar-98 10.78 11.49 0.70 18.18 14.93 -3.25
Argentina 34.44 67.52 33.08 28.89 59.16 30.27
Venezuela 11.49 14.55 3.06 27.44 29.70 2.26
France 6.48 11.55 5.07 9.41 13.78 4.36
Germany 5.41 12.51 7.10 11.92 22.75 10.84
Italy 4.13 5.40 1.28 9.74 11.10 1.36
Netherlands 5.71 7.28 1.57 6.05 15.48 9.43
United States 5.99 7.71 1.72 13.03 18.83 5.80
Indonesia 9.46 14.97 5.51 15.73 25.56 9.83
Malaysia 9.69 18.16 8.46 13.19 26.66 13.47
Non-targeters Mean 10.31 17.74 7.43 15.05 24.78 9.74
Forecasts for Current Year Forecasts for Following Year
 
1/ Spain and Sweden are excluded because the data on inflation forecasts per forecaster is compiled after the implementation of an 
inflation target. Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore are excluded due to the many periods in which the median inflation forecast reported 
was close to zero. 
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Table 2. “Difference-in-Differences” Regression
1/ 
 
7.43 ** 8.50 ** 4.5 4.67 9.74 *** 22.42 *** 6.38 6.05
(3.29) (3.74) (3.44) (2.87) (2.88) (4.42) (4.53) (4.60)
-7.14 -6.94 -4.86 -4.89 -13.41 * -9.10 * -7.56 ** -7.63 **
(4.29) (4.92) (3.44) (3.44) (6.67) (5.19) (3.15) ( 3.06)
-0.1 0.29 0.29 -0.84 *** 0.24 0.28
(0.52) (0.42) (0.42) (0.20) (0.41) (0.40)
0.16 *** 0.40 ***
(0.05) (0.13)




21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
R
2 0.13 0.14 0.53 0.53 0.15 0.69 0.87 0.88
c
Forecasts for Following Year Forecasts for Current Year







* p < 0.10. ** p<0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
1/ Sample of countries as in Table 1. 
2/ White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. 
  25              Table 3. Results from Fixed Effects Estimation for all Countries
1/ 
 
a) Forecasts for Current Year 
0.70 -0.08 0.61 0.05
(0.61) (0.85) (1.05) (0.79)
-11.34 * -1.62 -2.14 -2.95













0.73 0.11 0.13 0.61
(0.48) (0.09) (0.10) (0.44)
R
2
0.01 0.30 0.30 0.30
worldinf*d_industrial
dit*d_industrial
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b) Forecasts for Following Year 
2.81 ** 2.13 ** 3.13 ** 2.52 **
(1.12) (0.86) (1.31) (1.13)
-14.39 *** -5.88 ** -6.63 ** -11.37 **
(5.02) (2.47) (2.81) (4.97)
0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.13 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)










0.66 *** 0.12 ** 0.15 ** 0.62 **
(0.22) (0.06) (0.07) (0.28)
R
2



















* p < 0.10. **  p<0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
1/ White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. 
2/ The countries used are: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela. 
Australia is missing because the inflation figures are quarterly. 
3/ For Chile, México and Peru, second dates of IT implementation are used. For Chile, the second date 
is September 1999, for Mexico February 2001 and for Peru, January 2002. 
4/ World average inflation rate as reported in the IFS series. 
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